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ABSTRACT 
BBN, Harvard, and Boston University are building the DARPA 
Quantum Network, the world’s first network that delivers end-
to-end network security via high-speed Quantum Key 
Distribution, and testing that Network against sophisticated 
eavesdropping attacks. The first network link has been up and 
steadily operational in our laboratory since December 2002. It 
provides a Virtual Private Network between private enclaves, 
with user traffic protected by a weak-coherent implementation 
of quantum cryptography. This prototype is suitable for 
deployment in metro-size areas via standard telecom (dark) 
fiber. In this paper, we introduce quantum cryptography, 
discuss its relation to modern secure networks, and describe its 
unusual physical layer, its specialized quantum cryptographic 
protocol suite (quite interesting in its own right), and our 
extensions to IPsec to integrate it with quantum cryptography. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors  
C.2.1 [Network Architecture and Design]: quantum 
cryptography. 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Measurement, Design, Experimentation, Security. 
Keywords  
Quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution, secure 
networks, cryptographic protocols, key agreement protocols, 
error correction, privacy amplification, IPsec. 
1. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION 
Modern networks generally rely on one of two basic 
cryptographic techniques to ensure the confidentiality and 
integrity of traffic carried across the network: symmetric 
(secret) key and asymmetric (public) key. Indeed today’s best 
systems generally employ both, using public key systems for 
                                                 
 
authentication and establishment of secret “session” keys, and 
then protecting all or part of a traffic flow with these session 
keys. Certain other systems transport secret keys “out of 
channel,” e.g. via courier, as in classical cryptography. 
Fundamental aspects of quantum physics – unitarity, the 
uncertainty principle, and the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen 
violation of Bell’s inequalities – now suggest a third paradigm 
for key distribution: quantum cryptography.  Initial 
experiments seem to confirm the utility of this paradigm. 
Assuming that the theoretical models continue to be confirmed 
in the use of actual devices, the fundamental laws of nature can 
be invoked to assure the confidentiality of transmitted data. 
As shown in Fig. 1, quantum cryptography – more properly 
termed Quantum Key Distribution, QKD – employs two 
distinct channels. One is used for transmission of quantum key 
material by very dim (single photon) light pulses. The other, 
public channel carries all message traffic, including the 
cryptographic protocols, encrypted user traffic, etc. 
QKD consists of the transmission of raw key material, e.g., as 
dim pulses of light from Alice to Bob, via the quantum 
channel, plus processing of this raw material to derive the 
actual keys. This processing involves public communication 
(key agreement protocols) between Alice and Bob, conducted 
in the public channel, along with specialized QKD algorithms. 
The resulting keys can then be used for cryptographic 
purposes, e.g., to protect user traffic. By the laws of quantum 
physics, any eavesdropper (Eve) that snoops on the quantum 
channel will cause a measurable disturbance to the flow of 
single photons. Alice and Bob can detect this, take appropriate 
steps in response, and hence foil Eve’s attempt at 
eavesdropping. 
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Figure 1. Quantum Key Distribution. 
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Quantum cryptography was proposed by Bennett and Brassard 
in 1984, who also defined the first QKD protocol, called BB84 
[1,2]. At time of writing, a handful of research teams around 
the world have succeeded in building and operating quantum 
cryptographic devices. Teams at Geneva, Los Alamos, IBM, 
and elsewhere are performing QKD through telecom fibers 
[3,4,5]. The best current systems can support distances up to 
about 70 km through fiber, though at very low bit -rates (e.g. a 
few bits/second). Teams at Los Alamos and Qinetiq [6,7] are 
performing free-space quantum cryptography, both through 
daytime sky and through the night at distances up to 23 km. 
In addition to these efforts, whose systems all employ weak-
coherent quantum cryptography, there is also interest in 
cryptography based on a very different physical phenomenon, 
namely entanglement between pairs of photons produced by 
Spontaneous Parametric Down-Conversion (SPDC). This form 
of cryptography has been demonstrated by Geneva [8,9] and 
discussed in a number of interesting papers [10-16]. 
The Geneva team has provided a superb overview of current 
state of the art in QKD [17]. We heartily recommend it to 
anyone interested in learning more about this fascinating field. 
2. DESIRABLE QKD ATTRIBUTES 
Broadly stated, QKD offers a technique for coming to 
agreement upon a shared random sequence of bits within two 
distinct devices, with a very low probability that other devices 
(eavesdroppers) will be able to make successful inferences as 
to those bits’ values. In specific practice, such sequences are 
then used as secret keys for encoding and decoding messages 
between the two devices. Viewed in this light, QKD is quite 
clearly a key distribution technique, and one can rate QKD’s 
strengths against a number of important goals for key 
distribution, as summarized in the following paragraphs. 
Confidentiality of Keys. Confidentiality is the main reason for 
interest in QKD. Public key systems suffer from an ongoing 
uncertainty that decryption is mathematically intractable. Thus 
key agreement primitives widely used in today’s Internet 
security architecture, e.g., Diffie-Hellman, may perhaps be 
broken at some point in the future. This would not only hinder 
future ability to communicate but could reveal past traffic. 
Classic secret key systems have suffered from different 
problems, namely, insider threats and the logistical burden of 
distributing keying material. Assuming that QKD techniques 
are properly embedded into an overall secure system, they can 
provide automatic distribution of keys that may offer security 
superior to that of its competitors. 
Authentication. QKD does not in itself provide authentication. 
Current strategies for authentication in QKD systems include 
prepositioning of secret keys at pairs of devices, to be used in 
hash-based authentication schemes, or hybrid QKD-public key 
techniques. Neither approach is entirely appealing. 
Prepositioned secret keys require some means of distributing 
these keys before QKD itself begins, e.g., by human courier, 
which may be costly and logistically challenging. Furthermore, 
this approach appears open to denial of service attacks in which 
an adversary forces a QKD system to exhaust its stockpile of 
key material, at which point it can no longer perform 
authentication. On the other hand, hybrid QKD-public key 
schemes inherit the possible vulnerabilities of public key 
systems to cracking via quantum computers or unexpected 
advances in mathematics. 
Sufficiently Rapid Key Delivery. Key distribution systems 
must deliver keys fast enough so that encryption devices do not 
exhaust their supply of key bits. This is a race between the rate 
at which keying material is put into place and the rate at which 
it is consumed for encryption or decryption activities. Today’s 
QKD systems achieve on the order of 1,000 bits/second 
throughput for keying material, in realistic settings, and often 
run at much lower rates. This is unacceptably low if one uses 
these keys in certain ways, e.g., as one-time pads for high-
speed traffic flows. However it may well be acceptable if the 
keying material is used as input for less secure (but often 
secure enough) algorithms such as the Advanced Encryption 
Standard. Nonetheless, it is both desirable and possible to 
greatly improve upon the rates provided by today’s QKD 
technology. 
Robustness. This has not traditionally been taken into account 
by the QKD community. However, since keying material is 
essential for secure communications, it is extremely important 
that the flow of keying material not be disrupted, whether by 
accident or by the deliberate acts of an adversary (i.e. by denial 
of service). Here QKD has provided a highly fragile service to 
date since QKD techniques have implicitly been employed 
along a single point-to-point link. If that link were disrupted, 
whether by active eavesdropping or indeed by fiber cut, all 
flow of keying material would cease. In our view a meshed 
QKD network is inherently far more robust than any single 
point-to-point link since it offers multiple paths for key 
distribution. 
Distance- and Location-Independence. In the ideal world, 
any entity can agree upon keying material with any other 
(authorized) entity in the world. Rather remarkably, the 
Internet’s security architecture does offer this feature – any 
computer on the Internet can form a security association with 
any other, agreeing upon keys through the Internet IPsec 
protocols. This feature is notably lacking in QKD, which 
requires the two entities to have a direct and unencumbered 
path for photons between them, and which can only operate for 
a few tens of kilometers through fiber. 
Resistance to Traffic Analysis. Adversaries may be able to 
perform useful traffic analysis on a key distribution system, 
e.g., a heavy flow of keying material between two points might 
reveal that a large volume of confidential information flows, or 
will flow, between them. It may thus be desirable to impede 
such analysis. Here QKD in general has had a rather weak 
approach since most setups have assumed dedicated, point-to-
point QKD links between communicating entities which thus 
clearly lays out the underlying key distribution relationships. 
3. THE DARPA QUANTUM NETWORK 
The DARPA Quantum Network aims to strengthen QKD’s 
performance in these weaker areas. In some instances, this 
involves the introduction of newer QKD technologies; for 
example, we hope to achieve rapid delivery of keys by 
introducing a new, high-speed source of entangled photons. In 
other instances, we rely on an improved system architecture to 
achieve these goals; thus, we tackle distance- and location-
independence by introducing a network of trusted relays. 
  
Whereas most work to date has focused on the physical layer 
of quantum cryptography – e.g. the modulation, transmission, 
and detection of single photons – our own research effort aims 
to build QKD networks. As such, it is oriented to a large extent 
towards novel protocols and architectures for highly-secure 
communications across a heterogenous variety of underlying 
kinds of QKD links. See [18] for rationale and details of our 
research plan. 
Our security model is the cryptographic Virtual Private 
Network (VPN). Conventional VPNs use both public-key and 
symmetric cryptography to achieve confidentiality and 
authentication/integrity. Public-key mechanisms support key 
exchange or agreement, and authenticate the endpoints. 
Symmetric mechanisms (e.g. 3DES, SHA1) provide traffic 
confidentiality and integrity. Thus VPN systems can provide 
confidentiality and authentication / integrity without trusting 
the public network interconnecting the VPN sites. 
In our work, existing VPN key agreement primitives are 
augmented or completely replaced by keys provided by 
quantum cryptography. The remainder of the VPN construct is 
left unchanged; see Fig. 2. Thus our QKD-secured network is 
fully compatible with conventional Internet hosts, routers, 
firewalls, and so forth. 
At time of writing, we are slightly over one year into a 
projected five-year effort to build the full DARPA Quantum 
Network. In our first year, we have built a complete quantum 
cryptographic link, and a QKD protocol engine and working 
suite of QKD protocols, and have integrated this cryptographic 
substrate into an IPsec-based Virtual Private Network. This 
entire system has been continuously operational since 
December 2002, and we are now in the process of 
characterizing its behavior and tuning it. 
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Figure  3. Our first quantum cryptographic link, based on interferometric phase modulation of single photons. 
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Figure  2. A Virtual Private Network (VPN) based on Quantum Key Distribution. 
  
In coming years, we plan to build a second link based on two-
photon entanglement, and to build various forms of end-to-end 
networks for QKD across a variety of kinds of links. We expect 
the majority of our links to be implemented in dark fiber but 
some may also be implemented in free space, either in the lab 
or outdoors. Section 8 describes our plans in brief form. 
4. THE PHYSICAL LAYER  
Fig. 3 highlights the major features of our weak-coherent link. 
As shown, the transmitter at Alice sends single photons by 
means of a very highly attenuated laser pulse at 1550 nm. Each 
of these photons passes through a Mach-Zehnder 
interferometer at Alice which is randomly modulated to one of 
four phases, thus encoding both a basis and a value in that 
photon’s self interference. The receiver at Bob contains another 
Mach-Zehnder interferometer, randomly modulated to one of 
two phases to select a basis. The received photons pass through 
Bob’s interferometer to strike one of the two thermo-
electrically cooled single-photon detectors and hence to present 
a received value. Alice also transmits bright pulses at 1300 nm, 
multiplexed over the same fiber, to send timing and framing 
information to Bob. 
Figs. 4-6 illustrate the basic mechanism underlying our phase-
encoding scheme for conveying qubits. As shown, Alice 
contains an unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer, i.e., an 
interferometer in which the two arms have different delays. 
Bob contains a similar interferometer; in fact, certain 
dimensions of the two interferometers must be kept identical to 
within a fraction of the QKD photon’s wavelength, i.e., a 
fraction of 1550 nm. We have labeled the various paths that a 
photon can follow through these interferometers for ease of 
discussion in the following paragraphs. 
Fig. 5 shows how a single photon behaves as its pulse proceeds 
from the 1550 nm QKD source at Alice towards the pair of 
detectors at Bob. Here one should visualize the photon as a 
wave rather than as a particle. Thus it follows both paths of 
each interferometer rather than having to choose a single path. 
Not surprisingly, the part of the photon pulse that follows the 
shorter arm of an interferometer emerges sooner than that part 
of the pulse that takes the longer arm. Reading from the left of 
Fig. 5, we see a single photon pulse emitted from the QKD 
source. It follows both arms in Alice’s interferometer and the 
part that follows the longer path (labeled LA) begins to lag 
behind that which takes the shorter path (SA). These two halves 
are combined at at the 50 / 50 coupler before they leave Alice 
and travel as two distinct pulses through the telco fiber loop. 
Once this double-pulse photon reaches the interferometer at 
Bob, it once again takes both paths through Bob. Thus the part 
of the double pulse that takes the top path (long path) will be 
delayed relative to that which follows the shorter, bottom path.  
Fig. 6 shows how Bob’s 50 / 50 coupler (just before the 
detectors) combines the resulting double pulses. If the 
interferometers are set correctly, the leading pulse in the upper 
train will align more or less precisely with the trailing pulse in 
the bottom train, and the two amplitudes will be summed. The 
right part of the diagram shows the resulting combined 
waveform at the 50 / 50 coupler just in front of Bob’s pair of 
QKD detectors. 
We are now, finally, in a position to explain exactly how ‘0’ 
and ‘1’ values are sent via QKD pulses between Alice and Bob. 
As we mentioned, this central peak emerged from the 
combination of double pulse assuming that Alice’s and Bob’s 
interferometers were aligned more or less precisely. This is in 
fact where the (basis, value) modulation enters the picture. 
First, we need a few basic facts from optics: 
· When a light ray is incident on a surface and the material 
on the other side of the surface has a higher index of 
refraction (i.e. a lower speed of light), then the reflected 
light ray is phase-shifted by exactly half a wavelength. 
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Figure 5. Effects of an unbalanced interferometer on a photon. 
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Figure  6. Recombined photon at 50 / 50 coupler just before Bob’s 
QKD detectors. The central peak is self-interfering. 
 
  
· When a ray is incident on a surface and the material on the 
other side has a lower  index of refraction, the reflected 
light ray does not have its phase changed. 
· When a ray goes from one medium into another, its 
direction changes due to refraction but no phase change 
occurs at the surfaces of the two mediums. 
· When a ray travels through a medium, such as a glass 
plate, its phase is shifted by an amount that depends on the 
index of refraction of the medium and the path length of 
the ray through the medium. 
With these facts as background, we can see how ‘1’ and ‘0’ 
symbols work in a phase-shifted QKD system. Fig. 7 provides 
a schematic overview of how the system works. As depicted, 
the central peak within a photon pulse contains a coherent 
interval (a) during which two distinct wave paths are present 
simultaneously. A close-up view of these waves, as in (b), 
shows that in general the two distinct waves have different 
phases – that is, the phase of the wave as it traveled through the 
SALB path is offset by some phase shift, D, from that which 
traveled through the LASB path. At the right, these two waves 
interact with the final 50/50 coupler in the system to present 
constructive interference for one detector (click) but 
destructive interference for the other (no click). 
Thus Alice can signal ‘0’ and ‘1’ symbols to Bob merely by 
adjusting the relative phases of these two waves, i.e, by 
adjusting the phase delta value (D) on a per-pulse basis. Alice 
does this by setting her phase shifter accordingly for each 
transmitted pulse. 
The phase-encoded variant of BB84 works as follows. Alice 
encodes the 0 or 1 value for a single photon in either of two 
randomly selected non-orthogonal bases. She represents the 0 
value by either the phase shift of 0 (basis 0) or p /2 (basis 1), 
and represents the 1 value by either p (basis 0) and 3 p /2 (basis 
1). Thus Alice can apply one of four phase shifts (0, p/2, p, 
3p/2) to encode four different corresponding (basis, value) 
pairs of the key as (00, 01, 10, 11). This is achieved by 
applying four different voltages to the Electro-Optical (E-O) 
phase shifter on the transmitter side. It can be seen that the 
voltage on the phase shifter can be derived as a sum of basis 
and value bits via a summing amplifier.  
When their phase difference is equal to 0 or p, Alice and Bob 
are using compatible bases and obtain nominally identical 
results (assuming a number of unrealistic assumptions such as 
zero noise, no photon loss, etc.). In such cases, Alice can infer 
from the phase shift she applied the detector hit  at the Bob’s 
end, and hence the bit value Bob registered. By the same 
process of logic, Bob can deduce which value Alice 
transmitted. However, when Alice and Bob didn’t randomly 
agree on the same basis (i.e. when their phase difference equals 
p/2 or 3p/2), the bases are incompatible and the photon strikes 
one of the two APDs at random. 
Alice provides the clock source (trigger) for both transmitter 
and receiver. All clocking in this system ultimately derives 
from a single trigger supplied from higher layers in the 
protocol stack, and drawn in Fig. 3 as descending from above 
the Transmitter suite. This clock comes from a FIFO card on a 
real-time Optical Process Control (OPC) computer not 
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Figure  8. Physical layers of our weak-coherent link in the laboratory (Alice at left, Bob at right). 
  
discussed in this paper. 
The rising edge of this signal serves as a trigger for the 
transmitter suite. It triggers a pulse generator that in turn emits 
two further triggers: one leads immediately to the 1300 nm 
bright source laser, and the other is delayed and then given to 
the 1550 nm QKD source laser. Thus the 1300 nm bright pulse 
laser transmits first, followed a short time later by a dim (single 
photon) pulse from the 1550 nm QKD source laser. This fixed 
delay is designed to allow sufficient time for Bob to gate his 
QKD detectors after receiving the bright pulse. 
On the receiver side, Bob’s pair of 1550 nm QKD detectors are 
operated in the Geiger gated mode, where the applied bias 
voltage exceeds the breakdown voltage for a very short period 
of time when a photon is expected to arrive, leading an 
absorbed photon to trigger an electron avalanche consisting of 
thousands of carriers. Since the typical gating interval is a few 
ns, this mode of operation requires some knowledge of the 
photon arrival time, which is deduced from the 1300 nm bright 
pulse (synchronization) laser and passively quenched sync 
detector, which generate and detect the trigger signal for the 
gated APD detectors after a known delay. 
At Bob, the received annunciator pulse from the 1300 nm 
Bright Pulse Detector triggers the gating of Bob’s cooled APDs 
to set the detectors’ bias voltages high just around the time that 
the 1550 nm QKD photon arrives. Bob interprets a click on 
APD Detector 0 (D0) as a bit value of “0”, and on Detector 1 
(D1) as “1”. After Bob samples these detectors, it then sets up 
for the next incoming QKD photon by randomly applying a 
phase shift of either 0 or p /2 to the Phase Shifter.  
Actively controlled fiber stretchers are required in order to 
stabilize path length during transmission and to maintain the 
equivalence of interferometers on both sides, with the same 
coupling ratios in each arm and the same path length. 
Moreover, the optical components, such as phase shifters and 
phase adjusters, are polarization dependent, requiring a 
polarization-maintaining fiber for both interferometers and 
active polarization controller on the receiver side to restore 
polarization after passing regular telecom fiber. 
At time of writing, our weak-coherent link is operating with a 1 
MHz pulse repetition rate, mean photon-emission number of 
0.1 photons per pulse, and approximately a 6-8% Quantum Bit 
Error Rate (QBER) on the detectors cooled to –30 C. 
5. QKD PROTOCOLS IMPLEMENTATION 
Quantum cryptography involves a surprisingly elaborate suite 
of specialized protocols, which we term “QKD protocols.” 
Many aspects of these protocols are unusual – both in 
motivation and in implementation – and may be of interest to 
specialists in communications protocols. 
This section describes the protocols now running in our C-
language QKD protocol implementation. We have designed 
this engine so it is easy to “plug in” new protocols, and exp ect 
to devote considerable time in coming years to inventing new 
QKD protocols and trying them in practice. As shown in Fig. 5, 
these protocols are best described as sub-layers within the 
QKD protocol suite. Note, however, that these layers do not 
correspond in any obvious way to the layers in a 
communications stack, e.g., the OSI layers. As will be seen, 
they are in fact closer to being pipeline stages. 
Sifting is the process whereby Alice and Bob winnow away all 
the obvious “failed qubits” from a series of pulses. As 
described in the introduction to this section, these failures 
include those qubits where Alice’s laser never transmitted, 
Bob’s detectors didn’t work, photons were lost in transmission, 
and so forth. They also include those symbols where Alice 
chose one basis for transmission but Bob chose the other for 
receiving. 
At the end of this round of protocol interaction – i.e. after a sift 
and sift response transaction – Alice and Bob discard all the 
useless symbols from their internal storage, leaving only those 
symbols that Bob received and for which Bob’s basis matches 
Alice’s. 
In general, sifting dramatically prunes the number of symbols 
held in Alice and Bob. For instance, assume that 1% of the 
photons that Alice tries to transmit are actually received at Bob 
and that the system noise rate is 0. On average, Alice and Bob 
will happen to agree on a basis 50% of the time in BB84. Thus 
only 50% x 1% of Alice’s photons give rise to a sifted bit, i.e., 
1 photon in 200. A transmitted stream of 1,000 bits therefore 
would boil down to about 5 sifted bits. 
Error correction allows Alice and Bob to determine all the 
“error bits” among their shared, sifted bits, and correct them so 
that Alice and Bob share the same sequence of error-corrected 
bits. Error bits are ones that Alice transmitted as a 0 but Bob 
received as a 1, or vice versa. These bit errors can be caused by 
noise or by eavesdropping. 
Error correction in quantum cryptography has a very unusual 
constraint, namely, evidence revealed in error detection and 
correction (e.g. parity bits) must be assumed to be known to 
Eve, and thus to reduce the hidden entropy available for key 
material. As a result, there is very strong motivation to design 
error detection and correction codes that reveal as little as 
possible in their public control traffic between Alice and Bob. 
Our first approach for error correction is a novel variant of the 
Cascade protocol [19] and algorithms. The protocol is adaptive, 
in that it will not disclose too many bits if the number of errors 
is low, but it will accurately detect and correct a large number 
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Fig. 9. The QKD protocol stack. 
  
of errors (up to some limit) even if that number is well above 
the historical average. 
Our version works by defining a number of subsets (currently 
64) of the sifted bits and forming the parities of each subset. In 
the first message, the list of subsets and their parities is sent to 
the other side, which then replies with its version of the 
parities. The subsets are pseudo-random bit strings, from a 
Linear-Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) and are identified by a 
32-bit seed for the LFSR. Once an error bit has been found and 
fixed, both sides inspect their records of subsets and subranges, 
and flip the recorded parity of those that contained that bit. 
This will clear up some discrepancies but may introduce other 
new ones, and so the process continues. 
Since these parity fields are revealed in the interchange of 
“error correction” messages between Alice and Bob, these bits 
must be taken as known to Eve. Therefore, the QKD protocol 
engine records amount of information revealed (lost) due to 
parity fields, and later requires a compensating level of privacy 
amplification to reduce Eve’s knowledge to acceptable levels. 
Privacy amplification is the process whereby Alice and Bob 
reduce Eve’s knowledge of their shared bits to an acceptable 
level. This technique is also often called advantage distillation. 
The side that initiates privacy amplification chooses a linear 
hash function over the Galois Field GF[2n] where  n  is the 
number of bits as input, rounded up to a multiple of 32. He 
then transmits four things to the other end—the number of bits 
m  of the shortened result, the (sparse) primitive polynomial of 
the Galois field, a multiplier (n bits long), and an m-bit 
polynomial to add (i.e. a bit string to exclusive-or) with the 
product. Each side then performs the corresponding hash and 
truncates the result to  m  bits to perform privacy amplification. 
Authentication allows Alice and Bob to guard against “man in 
the middle attacks,” i.e., allows Alice to ensure that she is 
communicating with Bob (and not Eve) and vice versa. 
Authentication must be performed on an ongoing basis for all 
key management traffic, since Eve may insert herself into the 
conversation between Alice and Bob at any stage in their 
communication. 
The original BB84 paper [1] described the authentication 
problem and sketched a solution to it based on universal 
families of hash functions, introduced by Wegman and Carter 
[20].  This approach requires Alice and Bob to already share a 
small secret key, which is used to select a hash function from 
the family to generate an authentication hash of the public 
correspondence between them.  By the nature of universal 
hashing, any party who didn’t know the secret key would have 
an extremely low probability of being able to forge the 
correspondence, even an adversary with unlimited 
computational power.  The drawback is that the secret key bits 
cannot be re-used even once on different data without 
compromising the security.  Fortunately, a complete 
authenticated conversation can validate a large number of new, 
shared secret bits from QKD, and a small number of these may 
be used to replenish the pool. 
There are many further details in a practical system which we 
will only mention in passing, including symmetrically 
authenticating both parties, limiting the opportunities for Eve 
to force exhaustion of the shared secret key bits, and adapting 
the system to network asynchrony and retransmissions.  
Another important point: it is insufficient to authenticate just 
the QKD protocols; we must also apply the these techniques to 
authenticate the VPN data traffic. 
6. A DISQUISITION ON EVE 
Within the quantum cryptographic community, Eve is 
generally understood to be limited only by the known laws of 
physics, and to otherwise possess engineering and 
mathematical powers far beyond the current state of the art. In 
particular, it is axiomatic that Eve can: 
· Instantly break all symmetric ciphers and public key 
primitives. 
· Detect all dim pulses with zero loss. 
· Create dim pulses that are indistinguishable from Alice’s 
except for the limitations of quantum physics (e.g. the no-
cloning law). 
· Transport photons to Bob with zero loss. 
· Eavesdrop undetectably on the public channel. 
· Forge or block messages on the public channel. 
It will be seen that, given these basic axioms, Eve can launch 
highly formidable eavesdropping and “man in the middle” 
attacks against Alice and Bob since she can interpose herself 
along the photonic channel between Alice and Bob in ways that 
are very hard to detect, and instantly defeat all ciphers on the 
“public channel” except one-time pads. Defense against such 
extreme attacks plays a major role in the theoretical security of 
a full quantum cryptographic system. 
Privacy amplification depends on having an estimate of the 
eavesdropping-free entropy of the quantum channel—the 
amount of information in the channel beyond what Eve might 
know. The estimate is made after sifting and error correction, 
and any randomness or bias testing. The inputs to entropy 
estimation are: 
b, the number of received bits (sifted) 
e, the number of errors in the sifted bits 
n, the total number of bits transmitted 
d, the number of parity bits disclosed during error correction 
r, a non-randomness measure from randomness tests 
 
The components of the entropy estimate are: 
· An estimate of the information Eve possesses due to non-
transparent (error-inducing) observations. 
· An estimate of the information Eve might possess due to 
transparent eavesdropping—observations that have no 
effect on the error rate, e.g. beamsplitting attacks, 
interceptions of multi-photon pulses, and the like. 
· The amount of information disclosed publicly during error 
detection and correction. 
· An estimate of the information Eve might possess due to 
non-randomness in the raw QKD bits (detector bias, for 
example). 
Of these components, only the third—publicly disclosed 
information—is clear and non-controversial: it is precisely the 
  
number of sets of bits whose parities have been disclosed. The 
fourth—the non-randomness measure—is only a placeholder at 
the moment, until randomness testing is put into the system. 
We assume that this testing will produce an measure in the 
form of a number of bits by which to shorten the string. 
Information from transparent eavesdropping is not uniformly 
treated in the QKD community. This category includes all 
eavesdropping that doesn’t cause errors, which was originally 
thought to include only beamsplitting attacks on multi-photon 
pulses. It is now becoming clear that there are more general 
attacks of the same ilk. For instance, Brassard et al. [13] have 
pointed out that all weak coherent systems are particularly 
vulnerable to so-called “Positive Operator Valued Measure” 
attacks. The amount of information leakage can be proportional 
to the number of transmitted bits times the multi-photon 
probability, rather than the number of bits received by Bob. 
With an entangled-photon link, by contrast, the amount of 
information Eve may obtain is only proportional to the number 
of received bits times the multi-photon probability.  
An unresolved issue is the amount of information Eve obtains 
due to non-transparent eavesdropping. Following Slutsky et al. 
[21], we call these defense functions. Several defense functions 
have been published for quantum cryptographic systems. Two 
of the best known are by Bennett, et al. [1]  and Slutsky et al 
[21]; see Appendix for details. Neither appears to be 
completely accurate—Bennett’s estimate does not take into 
account all the information Eve can get from indirect attacks 
that give an error rate less than 25%, and while Slutsky’s 
estimate may be asymptotically correct, it is overly 
conservative for finite-length blocks. 
Because we expect to refine entropy estimates in future, and 
perform comparisons of different systems under like 
assumptions, we provide a choice of defense function. At 
present, we support both Bennett and Slutsky. Both estimates 
include a margin for certainty based on the standard deviation. 
In Bennett’s estimate, this is 5 standard deviations, including 
the standard deviation of the multi-photon probability. In 
Slutsky’s case it is parameterizable in terms of probability of a 
successful attack, but doesn’t include multi-photon 
probabilities. For consistency, we separate out the standard 
deviation of each term and combine them at the end, times a 
confidence parameter c (so a parameter c = 5 mean 5 standard 
deviations, or about 10–6 chance of successful eavesdropping). 
7. IPSEC EXTENSIONS 
Once “finished” quantum cryptographic key material is 
available, it can be employed as keys for one or more 
applications. Our first use of such key material is as standard 
cryptographic keys for IPsec-based Virtual Private Networks. 
We have accordingly extended both the IPsec traffic processing 
path and its key agreement protocol (IKE) to employ key 
material obtained by quantum cryptography. 
Because new key material is constantly streaming into both 
Alice and Bob, they can both update the keys used in their 
cryptographic algorithms more or less continually. At present 
we use these keys as input to the IPsec Phase 2 hash, and 
update the resultant AES keys about once a minute. 
IPsec is an architectural framework for secure communications 
within the Internet Protocol suite. This framework is defined by 
a standards-track document within the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), namely RFC 2401, Security Architecture 
for the Internet Protocol. One of its components, the Internet 
Key Exchange (IKE) protocol, permits two endpoints to agree 
first on which cryptographic protocols and algorithms they 
wish to employ for a given security association, and second on 
the keys they use to encrypt and/or authenticate subsequent 
message traffic within that security association. IKE is defined 
by its own standards-track document within the IETF,  RFC 
2409, The Internet Key Exchange (IKE). 
Although IKE is a relatively complicated protocol, its basic 
concepts are straightforward. Fig. 11 depicts the most 
important elements involved in an ongoing relationship 
between two IKE peers. This illustration is intended to be high-
level and schematic rather than a detailed depiction of an actual 
software architecture. 
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Figure  10. Simplified schematic of the IKE / IPsec architecture for Virtual Private Networks. 
  
Every security association has a maximum lifetime which 
governs how long the key material for that association can be 
used. This lifetime can be expressed either in time (seconds) or 
in data encrypted (kilobytes) and is configured via the Security 
Policy Database (SPD) entry for a given security association. 
Every time the lifetime expires, a new security association 
must be negotiated and it will bring with it fresh key material. 
This is sometimes termed “key rollover,” because it replaces an 
older key by a newer one while still protecting the same 
underlying traffic flow. 
The key size needed for an encryption or hash algorithm 
depends on the specific algorithm being employed. Some 
algorithms always use the same key size. For others, which can 
accept a range of key sizes, the Security Policy Database (SPD) 
must list the actual key size that should be employed for a 
given SA. 
Our first implementation runs in NetBSD with the ‘raccoon’ 
IKE daemon. We have modified both the kernel and the IKE 
daemon to introduce QKD extensions. (The QKD protocol 
engine also runs on the same NetBSD platform.) 
Our extensions to date fall into two basic categories: those that 
use QKD techniques for agreement on secret keys that are then 
employed as seeds for conventional symmetric ciphers (e.g. 
AES and 3DES) with continual and automatic reseeding by 
fresh QKD bits, and those that use a sequence of QKD bits as a 
one-time pad or Vernam cipher for the message traffic. 
In the rapid-reseeding extension, we have included distilled 
QKD bits into the IKE Phase 2 hash, so that keys protecting 
IPsec Security Associations (SAs) are derived from QKD. Fig. 
12 shows the very first time this extension worked with real 
QKD bits, i.e., the first time to our knowledge that a VPN was 
created that protected its traffic with quantum cryptography. 
In the one-time pad extension, we have introduced one-time 
pad mechanisms into IKE and IPsec traffic processing, with all 
the adjutant changes to protocols and algorithms required, and 
the necessary linkages into the secret bits obtained via QKD. 
Ancillary changes include policy mechanisms to specify when 
either of these extensions should be used, on a per-tunnel basis, 
and negotiation mechanisms to agree on which QKD bits will 
be used. Thus our implementation currently supports multiple 
VPNs per cryptographic gateway, each with its own set of 
cryptographic algorithms, keys, rekey rates, and so forth. Some 
may use conventional cryptography (e.g. AES), while others 
employ one-time pads, depending on how sensitive traffic is 
within a given VPN. 
Use of IKE for quantum cryptography calls special attention to 
a few rarely-exercised parts of the IKE design that may have 
some impact on our overall system design. 
The first such aspect concerns timeouts, in particular, the 
maximal amount of time that can elapse during an IKE 
negotiation. Such values are often set to 10s of seconds for 
Phase 1 negotiation, and less than 10 seconds for Phase 2. 
These values may be too small for systems employing QKD 
since it may take a while to accumulate enough bits for a 
successful negotiation. In addition, of course, this narrow 
window makes Eve’s denial-of-service attacks somewhat easier 
since she must block IKE messages during only a relatively 
short time in order to bring down the security association(s). 
The second concerns what IKE does when Alice and Bob 
believe they possess secret bits in common but in fact these 
two sets of bits are not identical. This may well happen in 
quantum cryptography, since noise on the single-photon 
channel can only be detected and corrected probabilistically. 
As it happens, IKE has no mechanisms for noticing or dealing 
with such cases. The result appears to be that all security 
associations that employ key bits derived from this corrupted 
information will fail to properly encrypt / decrypt traffic. This 
situation will apparently continue until the security association 
is renewed, i.e., rolls over to a new security association. This 
aspect of IKE provides some pressure for adjusting the QKD 
error correction protocols towards a low residual bit error rate. 
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Figure  11. Our architecture for Virtual Private Networks based on quantum cryptography. 
  
Finally we note that our QKD work is not closely tied to IKE 
itself. It is readily portable to IKEv2, JFK, or indeed upper-
layer protocols such as SSL in short order. 
8. PLANS FOR THE NEXT STEPS 
We are now starting to build multiple QKD links woven into 
an overall QKD network that connects its QKD endpoints via a 
mesh of QKD relays or routers. When a given point-to-point 
QKD link within the relay mesh fails – e.g. by fiber cut or too 
much eavesdropping or noise – that link is abandoned and 
another used instead. This emerging DARPA Quantum 
Network can be engineered to be resilient even in the face of 
active eavesdropping or other denial-of-service attacks. 
Such QKD networks can be built in several ways. In one 
variant, the QKD relays may only transport keying material. 
After relays have established pairwise agreed-to keys along an 
end-to-end point, e.g., between the two QKD endpoints, they 
may employ these key pairs to securely transport a key “hop by 
hop” from one endpoint to the other, being onetime-pad 
encrypted and decrypted with each pairwise key as it proceeds 
from one relay to the next. In this approach, the end-to-end key 
will appear in the clear within the relays’ memories proper, but 
will always be encrypted when passing across a link. Such a 
design may be termed a “key transport network.” 
Alternatively, QKD relays may transport both keying material 
and message traffic. In essence, this approach uses QKD as a 
link encryption mechanism, or stitches together an overall end-
to-end traffic path from a series of QKD-protected tunnels. 
Such QKD networks bring important benefits that greatly 
mitigate the drawbacks of point-to-point links enumerated at 
the start of this section. First, they can extend the geographic 
reach of a network secured by quantum cryptography, since 
wide-area networks can be created by a series of point-to-point 
links bridged by active relays. Links can be heterogeneous 
transmission media, i.e., some may be through fiber while 
others are freespace. Thus in theory such a network could 
provide fully global coverage. Second, they lessen the chance 
that an adversary could disable the key distribution process, 
whether by active eavesdropping or simply by cutting a fiber. 
A QKD network can be engineered with as much redundancy 
as desired simply by adding more links and relays to the mesh. 
Third, QKD networks can greatly reduce the cost of large-scale 
interconnectivity of private enclaves by reducing the required 
(N x N-1) / 2 point-to-point links to as few as N links in the 
case of a simple star topology for the key distribution network. 
Such QKD networks do have drawbacks, however. Their prime 
weakness is that the relays must be trusted. Since keying 
material and – directly or indirectly – message traffic are 
available in the clear in the relays’ memories, these relays must 
not fall into an adversary’s hands. They need to be in 
physically secured locations and perhaps guarded if the traffic 
is truly important. In addition, all users in the system must trust 
the network (and the network’s operators) with all keys to their 
message traffic. Thus a pair of users with unusually sensitive 
traffic must expand the circle of those who can be privy to it to 
include all machines, and probably all operators, of the QKD 
network used to transport keys for this sensitive traffic. 
As in classical cryptography, an end-to-end approach is likely 
to provide the most satisfactory architecture for disentangling 
the users’ keying material for secured traffic flows from the 
network that transports such flows. Hence we are building 
unamplified photonic switches into our QKD network 
architecture in order to provide end-to-end key distribution via 
a novel mesh of untrusted switches.  
Untrusted QKD switches do not participate in QKD protocols 
at all. Instead they set up all-optical paths through the network 
mesh of fibers, switches, and endpoints. Thus a photon from its 
source QKD endpoint proceeds, without measurement, from 
switch to switch across the optical QKD network until it 
reaches the destination endpoint at which point it is detected. 
We currently anticipate that the QKD switches will be built 
from MEMS mirror arrays, or equivalents, together with novel 
distributed protocols and algorithms that allow end-to-end path 
setup across the network, and that (as in untrusted networks) 
provide a robust means for routing around eavesdropping or 
failed links. 
Untrusted QKD networks have different strengths and 
weaknesses than trusted QKD networks. Their main strength is 
that support truly end-to-end key distribution; QKD endpoints 
need not share any secrets with the key distribution network or 
its operators. This feature may be extremely important for 
highly secure networks. Their weaknesses appear significant, 
however. Unlike trusted relays, untrusted switches cannot 
extend the geographic reach of a QKD network. In fact, they 
may significantly reduce it since each switch adds at least a 
fractional dB insertion loss along the photonic path. In 
addition, it will also prove difficult in practice to employ a 
variety of transmission media within an untrusted network, 
since a single frequency may not work well along a composite 
path that includes both fiber and freespace links. Untrusted 
networks may also introduce new vulnerabilities to traffic 
analysis.  
Dec  5 12:53:32 bob-gw racoon: INFO: isakmp.c:1046:isakmp_ph2begin_r(): respond new phase 2 negotiation: 192.1.99.35[0]<=>192.1.99.34[0] 
Dec  5 12:53:32 bob-gw racoon: INFO: proposal.c:1023:set_proposal_from_policy(): RESPONDER setting QPFS encmodesv 1 
Dec  5 12:53:32 bob-gw racoon: INFO: bbn-qkd-qpd.c:1047:qke_create_reply(): reply 1 Qblocks 1024 bits 1024.000000 entropy (offer is 1 Qblocks) 
Dec  5 12:53:32 bob-gw racoon: INFO: oakley.c:473:oakley_compute_keymat_x(): KEYMAT using 128 bytes QBITS 
Dec  5 12:53:32 bob-gw racoon: INFO: oakley.c:473:oakley_compute_keymat_x(): KEYMAT using 128 bytes QBITS 
Dec  5 12:53:32 bob-gw racoon: INFO: pfkey.c:1107:pk_recvupdate(): IPsec-SA established: ESP/Tunnel 192.1.99.34->192.1.99.35 spi=163084584(0x9b87928) 
Dec  5 12:53:32 bob-gw racoon: INFO: pfkey.c:1319:pk_recvadd(): IPsec-SA established: ESP/Tunnel 192.1.99.35->192.1.99.34 spi=136597565(0x824503d) 
Dec  5 12:53:43 bob-gw racoon: INFO: pfkey.c:1365:pk_recvexpire(): IPsec-SA expired: AH/Transport 192.1.99.35->192.1.99.36 spi=30999473(0x1d903b1) 
Dec  5 12:53:43 bob-gw racoon: INFO: isakmp.c:939:isakmp_ph2begin_i(): initiate new phase 2 negotiation: 192.1.99.35[0]<=>192.1.99.36[0] 
Figure  12. Extract from the first IKE transaction setting up a VPN protected by quantum cryptography. Traffic flowed a few moments later. 
  
Looking to the later years of the DARPA Quantum Network, 
the principal weakness in untrusted QKD networks – limited 
geographic reach – may perhaps be countered by quantum 
repeaters. There is now a great deal of active research aiming 
towards such repeaters, and if practical devices are ever 
achieved, they should slide neatly into the overall architecture 
of untrusted QKD networks to enable seamless QKD 
operations over much greater distances than currently feasible. 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
The DARPA Quantum Network demonstrates that quantum 
cryptography may indeed be used, in practice, to provide 
continuous key distribution for Internet virtual private 
networks. However certain critical aspects of the theory of 
quantum cryptography are still very murky. These include the 
variety of possible attacks and the detailed quantum 
mechanical theory underlying photon production, propagation, 
detection, and so forth. In short, it is now clear that quantum 
cryptography is feasible in practice – but the question still 
remains as to whether it’s feasible in theory. Thus our network 
manifestly works, but it may not truly be secure! 
Accordingly, we believe that future work should proceed on 
two tracks. First, detailed security analyses must be carried out 
– ranging all the way from quantum mechanical analyses to 
more traditional network security analyses. Second, work 
should proceed at full speed on building out the next portions 
of the network – its next kinds of QKD links (based on 
entangled photon pairs), and its highly specialized switches.  
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APPENDIX 
QKD 
Sub-Function 
Specific Techniques in the 
DARPA Quantum Network 
Description 
Universal Hash Function 
[Not yet implemented ] 
Preposition a “small” shared secret key at Alice and Bob, and use 
this key as input to a Universal Hash function along with the refined 
bits obtained by QKD protocols. Use the result as a cryptographic 
checksum to verify Alice or Bob’s identify. 
Authentication 
Hybrid Public Key / 
Universal Hash Function 
Combine the Universal Hash Function approach with Public Key 
Cryptography, i.e., digital signatures. While this approach does not 
satisfy the purist quantum cryptographic community, it may be a 
good engineering approach for communities that believe that public 
key techniques are still useful. 
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 See Slutsky et al  [21] 
Estimation of 
Eve’s Knowledge 
Resultant Entropy For both Bennett and Slutsky estimates: 
bmnmscbmnmtdrb 21
2
21 ++------  
Privacy 
Amplification 
Universal Hash Function 
based on Rényi Entropy 
Use a hash function to reduce the size of a batch of error-
corrected, shared secret bits by an amount sufficient to reduce 
Eve’s possible knowledge of the resultant bits’ contents to a 
sufficiently small amount (e.g. far less than 1 bit’s worth). 
Parity Checks A conventional parity-checking scheme as widely employed in 
telecommunications systems. 
Error Correction 
Cascade Select random subsets of the sifted bits, compute and exchange 
parity bits on a subset to detect errors, and then use a divide-and-
conquer scheme to correct any detected errors.  
Sifting Run-Length Encoding Encode the sifting messages, as sent between Bob and Alice, 
efficiently so that runs of identical values (and in particular of “no 
detection” values) are compressed to take very little space. 
